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Home Affairs Minister Tonio Borg has ruled out a 
Whistleblower Act in the immediate future, saying new 
legislation was 'not indispensable' to protect 
whistleblowers ... Dr Borg said 'there were enough laws 
giving immunity to whoever exposed corruption and 
other crimes ... The drafting of a Whistleblower Act is not 
in the government's immediate legislative programme. 2 
This paper takes a fresh look at a judgement given by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1985 3 and argues that it contained 
serious flaws and unfortunate and costly contradictions. It involved a 
suit for damages against the European Commission (EC) instituted by a 
person who today is considered one of the world's most famous 
whistleblowers. He also happened to be Maltese. It was one of the very 
first cases where the EC was sued for damages. 4 
Whistleblowing has become a subject of legal study in its own 
right and has already been discussed by the author in a recent related 
paper. 5 
Stanley Adams' misadventures and unfortunate dispute with the 
EC is important for various reasons: it involved a case in which 
2 Karl Schembri, 'Whistleblower Act 'not indispensible' says Tonio Borg', Maltatoday, (San 
Gwann, Malta 30 April 2006) <http://archive.maltatoday.com.mt/2006/04/30/t5.html> 
3 Case 145/83 Stanley George Adams v Commission of the European Communities [1985) 
ECR 3539 Readers are encouraged to read the whole text of this judgement. It contains a 
useful and precise description of the whole story as it evolved and how EC officials acted 
in relation to Adams and to Roche. It traces the factual account from Adams' original 
letter of disclosure to the action he instituted against the EC. 
4 From what I can establish so far, his real name was Stanislau Formosa. Will Bennett, 
'Extravagant tastes of man of few means ', The Independent (London, 15 March 1994) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/extravagant-tastes-of-man-of-few-means-
corrected-1429109.html>; accessed 25 October 2011 
For his own personal reasons, Adams is not keen to recall his Maltese background or that 
his first wife was Maltese or even that Adams was not the surname he was born with. In 
his book, he only dedicates one page to his Maltese upbringing. Wikipedia places him on 
top of its list of whistleblowers. In its entry on Roche, it includes a substantial note 
describing Adam's disclosure of its illegal cartel arrangements. 
s David Fabri, 'No more heroes anymore? The whistleblowing dilemma: recent 
developments and a fresh look at some conceptual and legal issues' (2009) ld-Dritt Vol 
XX. Readers are directed to this paper and to the considerable material referred to 
therein. I have also referred to the Adams case in 'Whistleblowing in Malta: a note on 
recent developments, proposals and missed opportunities' in The Company Lawyer, Vol 23, 
No l, January 2002. 
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competition law, whistleblowing and liability in tort meet; it explains 
the responsibility in tort of the EC for the failures of its officials; and it 
adds insight into the obligation of confidentiality and on how breaches 
of confidence may occur through lack of care. It is a tale worth 
revisiting as certain questions of an ethical and regulatory nature have 
remained, in the view of the present writer, insufficiently addressed. 
Where possible, I have indicated a number of commentators and a few 
unexpected sources who have commented on Adams, his 
whistle blowing act and subsequent Court experience. 6 
The Local Context: The Competition Act and the new 
Whistleblowers Bill 
The first comprehensive legislation to safeguard competition in 
the market and to prevent restrictive arrangements between traders 
was the Competition Act of 1994. 7 Adopted in preparation for accession 
to the European Union following the publication of the White Paper 
6 The Wikipedia entry on Stanley Adams (whistleblower) provides a good convenient 
summary of the salient facts: 'Stanley Adams (born cl 927) is a former pharmaceutical 
company executive and corporate whistleblower, whose case was a cause celebre in the 
1970s. The Malta-born Adams was a senior executive with the Swiss pharmaceutical 
company Roche when in 1973 he discovered documents which indicated that the 
company was involved in price-fixing to artificially inflate the price of vitamins. He passed 
on the documents to the competition commission of the European Economic Community, 
aware that Switzerland, while not part of the EEC, had a free trade agreement with it. 
The EC failed to keep his name confidential during its investigation, passing documents 
containing Adams' name to Roche. Adams was arrested and charged with industrial 
espionage and theft. He was held in solitary confinement for three months. Adams' wife 
was told that he faced a 20-year jail term for industrial espionage. She committed suicide. 
In the end, Adams served six months in a Swiss prison. When released, he fled to the 
United Kingdom and, with the assistance of a number of Labour Party MPs, notably John 
Prescott, later deputy party leader, he attempted to recover compensation from both the 
Swiss government and the European Union. In 1985 the European Union agreed to pay 
Adams £200,000, about 40% of his total costs. He documented the saga in Roche vs 
Adams. 
In 1985, he was elected rector of St Andrews University (a student-elected post).' 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Adams_(whistleblower)> accessed 25 October 
2011 
1 Chapter 379 of the Laws of Malta 
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'Fair Trading ... the next step forward' 8, the Act set up the Office for Fair 
Competition and prohibited cartels, abuses of dominant positions, price 
fixing and other restrictive agreements and practices, imposing some 
very harsh penalties for breaches of the Act. Later amendments to the 
Act, including some very recent ones, have sought to strengthen the 
investigation and enforcement powers of the enforcement agency and 
make the law more effective. 9 
Despite all the good intentions of this and other legislative 
reforms in the consumer area, breaches of one nature or gravity or 
another will be committed. It is no mystery that business corporations 
often operate outside the law, sometimes using sophisticated methods 
to escape detection. Some acts of wrong-doing are discovered and 
stopped. Other breaches remain secret and go unpunished. This note 
wishes to suggest that in practice there may be little chance to detect 
and investigate serious corporate breaches in an effective manner 
unless the regulatory and enforcement authorities are able to access 
inside assistance from within the guilty business firms themselves. This 
proposition raises the issue of whistleblowing, a subject which carries 
relevant moral and legal implications. 
A proper Act to provide protection to whistleblowers is long 
overdue in our country. 10 A bill published some months ago remains 
pending before Parliament and neither side of the House seems 
particularly interested in pushing for its quick adoption. In any event, it 
is not a flawless bill. It reflects an underlying conviction that 
whistleblowers are to be tolerated rather than encouraged and oozes 
an impression that the law was drafted in order to respond to media 
and public pressure rather than out of an honest attempt to protect 
whistleblowers.11 
a Department of Information, Fair Trading ... the next step forward, November 1993 
9 Part XV of Act No YI of 2011 
1o 'The promise of a Whistleblower's Act is foremost on the agenda of newly-elected PM 
Gonzi.', Ma/tatoday, (San Gwann, Malta 16 March 2008) 
11 Protection of the Whistleblower Act, 2010, Bill 58 of 2010, published in the Gazette on 
8 October 2011 more than a year ago. See also 
<http://www.statecareandmore.eu/index.php/blogs/the-whistleblower-bi ll -a-good-
idea-.html?blogger=ivan.mifsud>. Former Prime Minister Alfred Sant has described the 
bill as "bullshit!', describing the structures proposed in the bill as insufficient and possibly 
counter-productive (Maltatoday, 28 November 2010). 
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In Switzerland a man from Malta .... 
In brief, Stanley Adams v European Commission is a European 
court case involving Malta-born Stanley Adams who forwarded to the 
Competition Commissioner of the European Union remarkable 
disclosures on a well-known and powerful multinational 
pharmaceutical firm, Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche), which was engaging 
in some serious and lucrative cartel activity. The practice was carried 
out in secret as it was in direct conflict with EC competition rules and 
breached the Swiss-EEC free trade accord. 
Following many years of service in senior management positions 
with the company in Europe and in Latin America, Adams discovered 
that his employers were engaging in price-fixing and other serious 
breaches of the competition laws. He became very upset and after 
giving his discovery some thought, he decided to reveal the details of 
this illegal activity to the competition authorities of the European Union 
in Brussels. For his pains, he was hounded and investigated, ending up 
in a Swiss jail for the unauthorised disclosure of business secrets. He 
later won some damages from the EC. Adams wrote a book about his 
experiences where he describes how business interests and the State 
machinery conspired 'to send whistle-blowers to jail to punish them for 
whistle-blowing.' 12 It will be argued here that even the ECJ was guilty of 
failure to give full justice to Adams through a regrettable mixture of 
flawed thinking, an inclination to blame Adams for taking such huge 
risks, and a failure to give proper value to the nature and consequences 
of the important disclosures which led to severe action being taken by 
the EC against Roche and its accomplices. 
The letter: 
So it was that on the evening of February 25th, 1973, at 
home in our flat in Basie, I sat down with Marilene 13 and 
typed a letter to Mr Albert Borschette, Commissioner for 
12stanley Adams, Roche versus Adams, Jonathan Cape, 1984. see also Fisse & Braithwaithe, 
Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 56 
n His second wife 
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Competition, at the E.E.C. in Brussels. We stamped it, put 
it in the mail, and went to sleep. The letter read as 
follows: 
Dear Sir 
Re: Offences against Article 86 in the sale of Bulk 
Vitamins and Chemicals in Europe 
I am writing this letter out of a sense of duty and I trust 
you will be able to take some action in this matter. I am 
not after any position in the E.E.C. institutions, nor am I in 
any way interested in compensation of any kind ..... 
... ... ....... .1 request you not to let my name be connected 
with this matter. However, I remain at your entire 
disposal... ... 
Yours faithfully 
Stanley Adams14 
Time magazine reported on Adams' case in the Monday 7 April 
1975 issue which carried a feature headed 'Spying' in Switzerland'. 
This was the opening paragraph: 
Secrecy in Switzerland is a big business, encased in laws 
that carry stiff penalties for violations like breaking the 
shroud of anonymity around numbered bank accounts. 
Sometimes, though, Swiss secrecy gets in the way of 
enforcement of other countries' laws. In one current case, 
the aftermath has been both bizarre and tragic; it includes 
the jailing of a former executive of a giant drug company, 
the suicide of his wife and a threat to have two high 
officials of the European Economic Community (Common 
Market) arrested if they set foot in Switzerland. 
1• Adams 21; Adams' statement that he was not after compensation is highly significant. 
He did not seek a bounty or other mercenary reward. Adams could not have predicted 
that years later he would actually end up instituting a historic case seeking financial 
compensation from the EC for recklessly betraying his identity, thereby ruining his life. 
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The Stanley Adams case 15 is a morality tale of sorts; a David v 
Goliath scenario which highlights the dangers of whistleblowing and 
the risks faced by those who practise it. The facts revealed in the 
judgement show the risks of retaliation by the whistleblower's 
employer. Some form of retaliation by the employer was to some 
extent predictable. What was much Jess foreseeable, and this is a key 
theme in this paper, was the risk of exposure or betrayal by the very 
public and important institution to which he had confided confidential 
information about his employer's illegal price-fixing conspiracies.16 
The EC} decides Stanley Adams v European Commission: The 
Commission defends itself; flaws in the judgement 
The Stanley Adams judgement needs to be examined in its 
factual and historical context. Mr Adams was no ordinary complainant 
seeking damages and the EC was no ordinary defendant. After having 
abused of Mr Adams' cooperation and imprudently placed his safety 
and wellbeing in jeopardy, the EC then proceeded to fight tooth and nail 
to refuse him any compensation for all the damages and suffering he 
had to endure. 
The EC presented three main pillars of defence to the ECJ. First, it 
tried to have the case dismissed on grounds of prescription, because 
too much time had lapsed from its failures. Then it tried to argue that in 
view of its special status it could not be sued for damages like any other 
person. Finally, it claimed not to have had any obligation of 
confidentiality towards its informant. All these three preliminary 
defence pleas were correctly dismissed by the Court. The morality and 
coherence of the EC's attempt to have the case thrown out by the ECJ on 
such grounds were unsatisfactory legally, socially and morally. The 
is It amazes me just how few in Malta are aware of this story. Students of European 
Studies would usually know this EC) decision as an early case which addressed the legal 
personality of EC and its liability in damages. Students generally miss the significance of 
Mr Adams' actions and the fact that he was Maltese. 
16 One is with regret reminded of the much-quoted aphorism originally coined by Voltaire 
that 'I can take care of my enemies, but God protect me from my friends.' 
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ECJ's dismissal of all three defence pleas hardly added prestige to the 
EC. 
The Adams case provides valuable lessons from various 
perspectives, especially for competition law and practice as it indirectly 
relates to huge corporations that were found to have ganged together 
to keep the price of basic health items high thereby increasing their 
profits at the expense of the public. It is also a lesson in moral courage 
and conscience, in business ethics, in the duty of confidentiality and in 
the beauty and dangers of whistleblowing. 
The Stanley Adams case and ECJ judgement can also provide 
guidance for regulators. Indeed, in this case, the Court judgement 
reveals them as no match for sharp business operators to whom they 
finally conceded to disclose copies of documentation that allowed them 
to identify the official in their company who had blown the whistle on 
their illegal activities. Regulators are expected to deal with their 
informants in a correct manner safeguarding their privacy and safety at 
all times. The EC admitted that it failed to alert Adams that the Swiss 
not only knew about him but that they had started criminal 
proceedings against him. The Court criticized the EC for having failed to 
alert Adams that Roche were on to him: 'The Commission was under a 
duty to take every possible step to warn the applicant ... it is common 
ground that the Commission did not even attempt to find the 
applicant.' 17 
The court also found that the EC officials acted carelessly in 
giving Roche copies of documents handed to them by Adams, and the 
EC had to pay the price. Before the ECJ, the EC pleaded, to its 
embarrassment in my view, that Adams had never specifically warned 
them of the risk that disclosure of the documents could lead to his 
identification by Roche. The Court rejected this plea and placed full 
responsibility on the EC officials who are defined as 'imprudent' and 
not sufficiently professional in the conduct of their relations with Roche 
and its crafty lawyers.10 Although the EC adopted a firm policy of not 
revealing the whistleblower's identity, they delivered documents to 
Roche in October 197 4 from which the company 'drew the conclusion 
11 Case 145/83 Stanley George Adams v Commission of the European Communities (1985) 
ECR 3539, paras 42-43 
ts Ibid para 40 
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that the applicant was the main suspect.'19 The judgement also 
confirms that in February 1975, a Commission official admitted to 
Roche's lawyer that Adams was the Commission's informant.20 
The documents released to Roche by the EC also enabled the 
Swiss public prosecutor to successfully prove that Adams was guilty of 
industrial espionage. He was condemned in absentia to one year in 
prison. Indeed, the ECJ found that the Swiss Criminal Court sentence 
specifically took into account that officials from the EC itself had 
admitted to Roche's lawyer that Adams had revealed secret information 
about Roche's price fixing activity.21 Inadvertently, the EC had 
facilitated Adams' criminal prosecution in Switzerland.22 
The first part of the Court sentence is coherent, and it is only 
towards the end that it falls off the tracks. This first part of the 
judgement places clear responsibility on the EC for its various failures 
and proceeds progressively towards asserting plaintiffs rights to be 
awarded substantial damages for the harm he had suffered. This 
direction is more or less reversed in one single paragraph in the final 
part of the judgement. This paragraph swiftly and without much ado 
reduces Adams' entitlement to damages by an incredible one-half, a late 
twist in the tail and the proverbial cold shower owing to its flawed 
finding of contributory negligence. The first fifteen pages go in one 
direction and slam the EC's claims and defence pleas. The last two 
pages go into a completely different direction and blame Adams for not 
keeping the EC informed of his whereabouts and holiday plans. This 
latter part is surprisingly unsympathetic to Adams and shows no 
benign understanding and acknowledgement of his good faith, and his 
and his family's misadventures at the hands of the Swiss authorities 
and Roche in the face of the EC's apparent relative helplessness. The 
turning point in this judgement commences with the following 
shocking statement: 'It must however be recognized that the extent of 
the Commission's liability is diminished by reason of the Applicant's 
own negligence .. .'23 
19 Ibid para 10 
20 Ibid para 13 
21 Ibid paras 15-16 
22 Ibid para 39 
23 Ibid para 53 
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The change of heart implied in this controversial paragraph 
reveals that while the ECJ was concerned in drawing up lines for future 
conduct to the EC, it had little time for the injured complainant. The 
withholding of 50% of the award on the stated grounds is nothing less 
than sensational, and outrageous, practically implying that these 
troublesome whistleblowers have only themselves to blame. 
The paragraphs in question indirectly (and surprisingly) blamed 
Mr Adams for having given rise to all his troubles: it destroyed much of 
the good argumentation and principled decisions comprised in the first 
part of the judgement.24 
In so finding, the ECJ inadvertently rewarded the EC for its 
bungling and its failure to warn Adams not to venture to Switzerland as 
his cover had been blown and the Swiss authorities were after him. As a 
result, the EC was spared half the damages that would otherwise have 
been awarded.25 
The reasons listed by the ECJ for refusing to hold the EC 
responsible for the total liability may be summarized as follows: 
(a) He did not keep contact with the EC and had not kept them 
updated with his movements. 
(b) He did not pester EC officials to be informed how far the 
investigation he had originally sparked was progressing. 
( c) He had not requested the EC to keep him informed of what 
they were doing with the documents he had passed on to 
them, (on the ground that Adams was aware that his identity 
could be established from the documents). 
( d) He should not have gone to Switzerland for a holiday as he 
must have realized that going there was a risky business. 
The Court ruled that Adams had not continued to follow the case. 
But Adams had no right to be informed. His role in the whole matter 
was voluntary and it was up to the EC not Adams to prosecute the case. 
Indeed, the EC had probably a right to protect its case and information 
even from Adams himself. The Swiss went to great lengths to try to 
establish who had leaked sensitive information. Adams had correctly 
made himself scarce. 
2• Incorporated in the previous 16 pages of the judgement 
2s It must also have warmed the hearts of Roche's senior executives to see Adams receive 
so little for the troubles they put him through. 
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The Court did not consider that Adams, who did not reside in 
Brussels, had no right to be informed that something unexpected had 
happened in the meantime to his disadvantage. He was not privy to the 
EC confidential internal dealings and investigations. Adams had done 
the honourable thing of disclosing the dishonourable commercial cartel 
implemented by his powerful employers but he had no consequential 
obligation or right to keep involving himself further. By whistleblowing, 
Adams did not acquire any official status within the EC and he gained 
no special right of access to its internal files and to its secret 
deliberations and investigations. All he asked was that his identity 
would be protected. So on this point, both the EC and the ECJ erred and 
failed considerably. 
Perhaps the worst part of the judgement is where the Court 
ruled that Adams was partly at fault for his suffering because he failed 
to follow the development of the investigation he had triggered by his 
letter. It held that Adams was guilty of contributory negligence to the 
extent that he was made to forfeit half of the eventual award. The Court 
did not explain why contributory negligence was an acceptable defence 
for the EC and why it was so serious to justify such a drastic reduction 
in the awardable damages. The Court failed when it suggested that by 
having reported the breach, Adams had a right or an obligation to 
enquire or, worse, to pester the EC to let him "know step by step how 
the case was proceeding. The claim that Adams should have kept 
himself informed is not only baseless but contradicts and shows 
complete ignorance of how informants and whistleblowers operate. 
Adams correctly kept his communications with the EC competition 
authorities to a minimum. The risks he undertook were massive 
enough. The finding of ECJ in this respect was greatly disrespectful and 
harmful to Adams. 
Another flaw in the judgement followed. The Court accepted that 
the EC had been informed by Roche's lawyer that the Swiss criminal 
authorities were set to prosecute both the whistleblower and the EC 
officials themselves for committing the crime of industrial espionage 
against a Swiss company. Nobody in the EC lifted a finger to warn 
Adams of this danger, partly because the officials thought Roche's 
lawyer had been bluffing. Their failure to warn Adams was disturbing. 
Perhaps it shows regulators not fully understanding the environment 
13 
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which they were seeking to regulate and being led astray by more 
cunning and experienced market operators and their legal advisers. 
If this was not bad enough, things got even worse in the 
judgement as the ECJ after establishing the EC's error in failing to alert 
Adams, proceeded to attribute contributory negligence to Adams for 
having visited Switzerland for a vacation with his family to meet up 
with his old friends there. He was completely unaware that thanks to 
the EC officials, the Swiss had managed to identify him from the 
documents he had passed on to the EC. As a consequence, the Swiss 
authorities were seeking to arrest and prosecute him at a stage when 
the EC officials - again by their own admission - had blown his cover by 
their ineptitude and lack of foresight. 
The ECJ's decision to reduce the award by half due to what they 
termed Adams' own contribution to his fate is, on this basis, outrageous 
and unjustified. Even if one gives the members on the EC some 
(undeserved) benefit of doubt, the high percentage reduced (50%) 
appears much too high and disproportionate. For the ECJ, Adams was 
no hero, did nothing especially meritorious, but was an individual who 
took a huge risk unnecessarily and therefore deserved no special 
mercy. The Adams case is precisely a case where notions of right and 
wrong either get confused or play no part, and where everybody is 
treated as equally guilty; heroes and villains are placed in the same 
boat. Halving the award on such flimsy grounds is something which 
one cannot easily accept either on legal or on ethical grounds. 26 
This paper suggests that the ECJ got it wrong and that as a direct 
consequence Adams suffered an additional undeserved injustice at the 
hands of this Court. This added a grave insult to the physical and moral 
injuries he and his family had already suffered at the hands of Roche, 
his former employers, and the Swiss authorities who connived with it. 
In this manner the ECJ gave little regard and value to the violation of 
Adams' rights to a private life and to enjoy freedom of movement. 
26God does not need whistleblowers because He can see everything Himself. That is how 
He caught Adam and Eve when they broke the golden rule. In other circumstances, inside 
help goes a long way to disclose and stop wrongdoing within an organization. 
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The same companies caught out and fined thanks to Adams' 
revelations later went on to create ever bigger cartels27 and were made 
to pay even higher punitive damages.2a 
Anonymous disclosures 
Adams offered his information and advice to the EC under his 
name and met its officials face to face. It would be here worthwhile 
exploring briefly the implications of an anonymous tip. Indeed, what 
would be the position if the leak was received by way of anonymous 
communication? How should regulators react to anonymous messages? 
First, in my view regulators would be very irresponsible to discard 
anonymous information. There is nothing wrong with anonymous 
alerts being sent to regulators. Anonymous messages may provide 
useful leads to critical information and may come from very credible 
27The Observer 25 November 2001 reported that Mario Monti fined a cartel colluding to 
raise the price of vitamin pills 523 million pounds, describing it as the most damaging 
case up to that date. Monti was also quoted as expressing the view that' ... the cartel could 
be dubbed 'Vitamins Inc' and was the most damaging cai;e the Commission had ever 
investigated.' 
za Roche eventually admitted its wrongdoing. In an official company media briefing held 
by Roche, the chairman and other senior officials tried hard to explain the position of the 
company after it was caught once again operating illegal anti-competitive agreements. It 
was investigated in the US and the EC and heavily fi ned by both. The chairman, Mr Fritz 
Gerber, provided some historical background on similar circumstances twenty years 
earlier: 'Ladies and Gentlemen, when I took over as chairman of Roche in 1978 the 
Stanley Adams story was good for a headline or two. As you will recall, in the spring of 
1973, Stanley Adams turned over company documents to the EC Commission while he 
was still an employee of our vitamins division. In June 1976 the Commission sentenced 
Roche to pay a fine of 300,000 Accounting Units for granting unlawful discounts to major 
vitamins customers .. .' 
Later the company admitted through Franz B. Humer, Chief Executive Manager 
and Head of the Pharma Division that: ' ... we are here to inform you that today, Roche has 
agreed to pay a fine of 500 million US dollars. The settlement covers all charges filed 
against the Group for anti-competitive conduct in the US bulk vitamins market .... " later 
adding: "As I said earlier, official inquiries are currently underway in the European Union. 
We therefore cannot make any statements about the course that may take or their 
possible consequences. Overall, the financial liabilities resulting from this matter, painful 
though they are, will not materially affect the long-term outlook for the Roche Group.' 
(Roche - Corporate Media News, 21 May 1999, issued in Basel 1999) 
15 
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informed sources, including as in Adams' case, a senior official, an 
insider. I have unfortunately heard persons in authority discard 
anonymous messages as something disdainful and unmanly. I think this 
attitude is wrong and short-sighted. Stanley Adams chose not to hide 
his identity to the EC. By so doing he added credibility and weight to his 
disclosures, but it involved a big risk. After what he paid for having 
done his moral duty, one would not be surprised that other 
whistleblowers might not be too happy to reveal their name and 
address. The final question whether a regulator or public authority may 
reveal that it had received an anonymous discloser regarding alleged 
wrongdoing at a particular firm must surely be answered in the 
negative. Such a disclosure could help the company identify the 
whistleblower. 
The European Commission Z011 
(" 
It has been a long time since the Adams judgement and the EC's 
approach and attitude to whistleblowing has remained uncertain and 
ambiguous. Recently however, a new regulation for the prevention of 
market abuse contained a specific provision on the need to protect 
persons who report market abuses. The recently published new 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
contains a novel provision for the protection of whistleblowers who 
disclose market abuse activities. The accompanying Explanatory 
Memorandum explains the provision: 
Protection and incentives for whistleblowers 
Whistleblowing can be a useful source of primary 
information and may alert competent authorities to cases 
of suspected market abuse. The Regulation enhances the 
market abuse framework in the Union introducing 
appropriate protection for whistleblowers reporting 
suspected market abuse, the possibility of financial 
incentives for persons who provide competent authorities 
with salient information that leads to a monetary 
16 
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sanction, and enhancements of Member States' provisions 
for receiving and reviewing whistle blowing 
notifications. 29 
The relevant article in the Proposal is Article 29, headed 
'Reporting of Violation'. Recitals 36 and 39 of the Proposal seem to 
introduce a very strong position in favour of whistleblowing that could 
assist the detection of market abuse activity. Actually, the recitals are 
stronger than the actual text itself, which does not even specifically 
refer to 'whistleblowers' or 'whistleblowing'. The protection of persons 
making relevant disclosures ('who offer salient information') is 
mandatory on member states. The Proposal allows member states to 
decide whether to put in place a system of incentives and rewards for 
whistleblowers. This rule will only be optional, but it marks an 
interesting and more enlightened change of policy on the EC's part. 30 
Conclusion 
It should be clear that the Adams case raises issues which 
remain very relevant today. The judgement and the facts revealed 
therein deserve fresh reappraisal as some of the legal and the ethical 
aspects of the judgement, and the manner in which some regulators 
behaved, were controversial and deserved censure. Serious questions 
still arise as to how persons in high regulatory positions should or 
should not have conducted themselves. The EC fiercely resisted Adams' 
claims despite having already admitted its involvement by paying for 
his bail to get him released from the Swiss jail and by settling related 
legal costs. Of course it is not unusual that when criticized, institutions 
tend to react defensively and they hate creating precedents, especially 
where the payment of compensation is involved. Even the EC's own 
treatment of its whistle blowers has not been impressively consistent or 
29<http://ec.europa.eu/i n ternal_market/ securities/ docs/ abuse /CO M_2 011_65 l _en.pdf> 
accessed 25 October 2011 - The question arises as to why action is being taken limitedly 
to protect whistleblowers in relation to market abuse and not generally to detect all 
serious financial crime. 
30 European Commission, Brussels, 20 October 2011, COM (2011) 651 final, 2011/ 
0295(COD) 
17 
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ethical. One would have expected that the EC accepted responsibility 
and at the very least argued on the quantum but not on the principle. 
To conclude, these would appear to be some of the various 
reasons why Stanley Adams v European Commission 1985 deserves 
closer attention from students of law: 
(a) it relates to serious breaches of competition law and 
reminds us how vital it is to have inside help in order to 
successfully prosecute a cartel arrangement; 
(b) it reveals the risks that bona fide whistle blowers face and 
the lack of appreciation they receive for their act of moral 
courage; 
( c) it is an early case of the EC being held liable in damages; 
( d) an award of damages may be reduced by the contributory 
negligence of the applicant; 
( e) it deals with (reckless) breaches of confidentiality 
obligations; 
(f) it throws light on the duties of regulatory and 
enforcement officials and on how they should conduct 
themselves; 
(g) it reveals that the EC is not infallible and may commit 
serious errors of judgement and more specifically, may 
fall short of the expected level of loyalty towards its own 
valuable informants; 
(h) it raises other significant business and professional 
ethical issues; · 
(i) it shows how an otherwise validly written judgement 
based on good and sound principles may be derailed by 
relatively minor factors; 
(j) it should finally serve to remind us that one of history's 
most famous whistleblowers was Maltese. 
It may be fitting to conclude this brief paper by quoting a famous 
actor who played the role of Stanley Adams on film: 
I loved doing A Song for Europe. That was a film I did 
about Stanley Adams, who actually blew the whistle on 
that big chemical company in Switzerland - Hoffmann La 
Roche - because they were forming illegal cartels. He was 
a very brave man. And then he was put through hell by the 
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Swiss police and his life was destroyed. That was a great 
role - Stanley Adams. 31 
Other notes and further reading: 
1. This case should not be confused with another judgement given by 
the ECJ on 7 November 1985, (Case 53/84), which deals with 
Adam's claim that Switzerland had broken the fair competition 
obligations undertaken in the Free Trade Agreement with the EEC 
concluded on the 22 July 1972 and that the EC had failed to take 
action on this alleged breach and ensure that Switzerland respected 
the provisions of the Agreement. Adams argued that Switzerland 
had breached the FTA by instituting criminal action against him 
thereby causing him damages. The application leading to this 
judgement was lodged on 29 February 1984. The application to the 
ECJ requesting the condemnation of the EC to pay damages to 
Adams had been filed on the 18 July 1983 (Case 145/83). The two 
applications were based on the same facts and the EC pleaded /is 
alibi pendens in its defence. The court here decided that the case was 
unfounded and outside its competence. 
2. Generally on whistleblowing: Chapter 7 of Business Ethics -
Readings and cases in Corporate Morality, W. Michael Hoffmann and 
Robert E. Frederick, McGraw-Hill, 3rd Edition, 1995. 
3. An extract from Adams' book is featured in the collection 
'Conscience be my Guide - an Anthology of Prison Writings', edited 
by Geoffrey Bould, Weaver Press, 2005. 
JlAn extensive interview with David Suchet at <http://www.strandmag.com/suchet.htm> 
accessed 11 March 2009: Suchet is better known for his role in the TV series as Hercule 
Poirot. He played the part of Adams in the film A Song for Europe (1985). Wikipedia: "In 
1985 Director/ Producer john Goldschmidt made the TV-Movie A Song for Europe, also 
known as A Crime of Honour, inspired by Adams' sto1y. The film was shown on Channel 4 in 
the UK, on ZDF in Germany, on SRG in Switzerland and on ORF in Austria. The British actor 
David Suchet and Goldschmidt won Royal Television Society Awards for the film ." - Stanley 
Adams (whistleblower) 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Adams_(whistleblower)> accessed 25 October 
2011 
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4. 'Whistleblowing at Work', Ed David B Lewis, The Athlone Press, 
2001 and materials quoted therein, especially chapter 11. 
5. 'The Strange Story of Stanley Adams', The Economic Research 
Council, ed Edward Holloway Winter 1983/84, Vol 13 No 4, page 12. 
6. In Ireland, during the Second Stage of the parliamentary debate on 
the Whistleblowers Protection Bill, 1999, members referred to 
various whistleblowing cases including Stanley Adams. Dail Debates 
Official Reports 16 June 1999. <http:www.irlgov.ie/debates-
99/16june99/sec13.htm> accessed on 11May2006. 
7. The Cost of Whistleblowing: Stanley Adams v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 
matters of Corporate Conscience, in Multinational Monitor, June 
1984, Vol 5, no 6 (Report by Ole Baekgaard) 
<http:/ /multinationalmonitor.org/hyper /issues/1984 /06/baekgaa 
rd.html> accessed on 5 February 2009. This report explains that the 
European Parliament had unanimously passed a resolution 'asking 
the Commission to intervene with the Swiss authorities and demand 
the re-ope ing df Adams' case and to compensate him for his losses'. 
The writer provides an unusual 1984 perspective from Denmark: 'In 
Denmark, consumer coops have taken an active interest in his case. 
In April this year (1984), they invited him to Copenhagen to address 
an audience representing a wide range of institutions and the press. 
The coops recognized that Adams ' case is of crucial importance to 
consumers worldwide'. 
8. Law and Contemporary Problems Vol 68:85: 'Judicial Review of 
European Administrative Procedure', Jurgen Schwarze, 2004, 
discusses aspects of the judgement on page 96. 
9. Political Corruption, Prescription and Whistleblowing, The Times 30 
August 1998 'As Brussels blasts the drug giants, the man who took 
on Roche and was jailed for it talks to Nick Mathiason', Blowing the 
final whistle, Guardian.co.uk/The Observer. 
10.SWP 17 /87 Hoffmann-La Roche v Stanley Adams - Corporate and 
Individual Ethics, Eric Newbigging, visiting professor in Business 
Policy, Cranfield University 1986: a detailed case study written for 
the purpose of teaching Business Policy. It comments briefly on how 
it happened that 'the European Court's award to Adams in 
November 1985 of around £500,000 was half his claim'. 
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